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Book Review
DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES. By Lloyd L. Weinreb. New York: The Free
Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. Pp. xi, 177.
$12.95
How many times have we heard lawyers or laymen lament the
failings of our criminal justice system, only to hear them finally
conclude: "But it's still the best system there is." In his book, Lloyd
L. Weinreb argues persuasively that American criminal process not
only falls short of being the best there is, but it denies us a system
which we can properly call "just."'
Weinreb's work is divided into two sections. The first part, which
comprises the bulk of the book, explains how criminal process works
and, more significantly, how it has failed to achieve effectively the
goals for which it was developed. In the second part, he describes
in general theory an "alternative model" which he considers to be
more in keeping with the goal of criminal process.2
Weinreb frames his critique in terms of the various stages of
American criminal process, beginning with criminal investigation,
and moving on to prosecution, guilty pleas and finally the trial. His
criticisms at each stage ring true for anyone who has perceived the
process from within for any period of time. What sets Weinreb's
treatment apart from the myriad works on the American criminal
justice system which currently glut our law libraries is his thoroughly dispassionate and intellectual approach to the problems he
discusses. The objections he levels at our criminal process, as well
as his "alternative model," are ideologically neutral and wholly
pragmatic. He assumes the posture of neither the civil libertarian
nor the "law and order" conservative. His model, for example,
would cut back drastically on the role and authority of the police
in our society, and at the same time curtail a number of constitutional rights of defendants which are currently deemed by our
1.

L. Weinreb,
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(1977).

2. Weinreb sees the goal of criminal process as the determination of guilt with a view
toward imposing a penalty. Id. at 1.
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collective legal psyche to be indispensable.
Central to Weinreb's book is his proposed restructuring of the
process of criminal investigation. He begins with the premise that
our police are required to perform schizophrenic functions in American criminal process. They perform extensive peace-keeping and
emergency assistance duties on the one hand, and investigative and
even judicial functions on the other.'
Weinreb argues impressively that those qualities which make the
police uniquely qualified to perform their duties as keepers of the
peace render them ill-suited to perform effectively in an investigative or judicial role.4 In his capacity as a "street cop," for example,
a police officer is required to move swiftly, generally on-the-scene,
and with force if the circumstances so require. In the course of these
duties, his overriding concern is to bring an emergency situation
under control where lives may be at stake.
Following an on-the-scene encounter with a suspect, this "street
cop" is required by our present system to transform himself into a
figure who exercises the judgment of "a neutral and detached magistrate." 5 He can no longer be that monolithic crime fighter whose
sole concern is the protection of a frail citizenry. His concern must
now shift to the rights of the individual he has just apprehended.
He is expected to administer the array of formalized arrest procedures, perhaps conduct a search of the suspect, a custodial interrogation or lineup, all in a manner that conforms with the latest edicts
from the United States Supreme Court and which splits the finest
constitutional hairs.
To remedy this apparent conflict, Weinreb suggests a principle of
separation.' While acknowledging that the principle is easier to
state than apply,7 he claims that after the police have made an onthe-scene arrest, their authority should end. The sole responsibility
of the police at this point should be to escort the suspect to other
officials, who will be responsible for whatever further steps are proper in furtherance of a criminal investigation or prosecution.
In response to the logical question of who should be responsible
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.at 13-14.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at

20-21.
42, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
40-41.
41.
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for the investigative and prosecutorial work which the police now
perform, Weinreb states:
We need, then, to establish the office of a magisterial investigator or investigating magistrate, whose responsibility for investigating and preparing a
case for prosecution is distinct from the work of the police . . . . As between
the police station and a public agency with the neutral, nonforceful trappings
of the judiciary, the choice is obvious. So too, the choice is obvious between
removal of the person to a police station, where he must submit to police
officers whose primary authority, training, and identity are bound up with
the use of force, and his immediate release into the custody of a judicial
officer trained for the tasks assigned to him.'

Thus, according to Weinreb, if the police do not catch a suspect
in the act and do not make an on-the-scene arrest, their authority,
strictly limited to its peace-keeping function, would permit them
only to report the crime and whatever evidence they have to the
appropriate magistrate.' It is thereafter the duty of the magistrate
to determine whether, and if so how, to investigate further.
Weinreb is not clear as to what, if any, role the police might
assume in this subsequent investigative stage. What is clear, however, is that to whomever the task should ultimately fall, any further
investigative steps will be subject to the magistrate's authority and
supervision.
As Weinreb himself admits, the notion of a magistrate performing
both prosecutorial and judicial functions is alien to our system of
criminal jurisprudence.'" I have some reservations regarding the
duality of the magistrate's role. Whether this investigating magistrate will head his own staff of investigators or merely supervise the
police in their investigative efforts, he might well lose that element
of independence which is both characteristic of and central to his
judicial role. Not every investigation concerns an open-and-shut
street crime. An investigating magistrate undoubtedly will be called
upon to suprevise more sophisticated and complex investigations
involving homicides, corruption and white collar crimes. These will
require a zealous and committed prosecutor whose total energies are
devoted to the investigation of such crimes. It is doubtful that a
magistrate who is carrying on a dual role will be able to muster the
8. Id. at 42.
9. Id. at 125.
10. Id. at 126.
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resolve and devote the time to such demanding investigative efforts
and, at the same time, remain sufficiently independent to perform
his judicial duties.
Weinreb's primary objection to our present system of criminal
investigation is the dual role which the police have played in it. It
thus appears inconsistent to replace the police as investigators with
a magistrate who, in addition to his investigatory duties, would also
sit as a judge. I would suggest that the duality of the magistrate's
role would be equally offensive to our sense of fair play. Surely, the
magistrate's legal training does not set him above the police officer
in his ability to assume dual responsibilities without compromising
one or the other.
Moreover, Weinreb does not convince me that police generally
perform their investigative functions poorly. The police have failed
only in those limited factual situations which give rise to close constitutional questions involving the rights of defendants. To say that
our police have not had an overabundance of success with pre-trial
identification procedures, search and seizure problems and custodial interrogation situations does not mean tha that they have
failed to fulfill their overall investigation function effectively. Our
detective forces, for example, solve numerous homicides, burglaries,
robberies, and arsons each year by utilizing investigative methods
which they have developed over decades of trial and error. To strip
them of this function merely because a magistrate may be tempermentally more adept at administering Miranda warnings" carries
Weinreb's point too far.
Finally, even if police were strictly limited to their so-called
peace-keeping duties, their investigative and judicial function
would not be wholly eliminated. "Search and seizure" and "stop
and frisk" situations, for example, would nevertheless confront police officers as a normal concomitant of their on-the-street encounters with suspects.
On balance Weinreb's alternative model as it relates to criminal
investigation is a reasonable one. Our police clearly are better
equipped to handle their peace-keeping functions than they are
those which are at least partially judicial in nature. The fourth, fifth
and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution, at least
11.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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as they have been interpreted and expanded by contemporary decisional authority, place an unrealistic burden on those who are
charged with the enforcement of our criminal laws. To the extent
that Weinreb's model would take this burden off our police, I would
applaud it.
Weinreb is correct in his claim that there is no legitimate reason
why many of the criminal procedures which immediately follow an
arrest are conducted in the hostile atmosphere of the police stationhouse. A magistrate, even one with investigatory authority, would
be a preferable vehicle through which routine booking procedures,
lineups or other forms of post-arrest identification, and in-custody
questioning of the defendant could be performed. The adoption of
this aspect of Weinreb's model would be a significant step in the
development of our criminal process. At the very least this procedure would clothe that critical stage in the criminal process immediately following the arrest of a suspect with an aura of detachment
and impartiality which it now lacks.
Thomas G. Roth*
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